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THE EXTERNAL SOURCES OF KENYA'S 
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS 
Phillip 0. Nying 'uro, University of South Carolina 
Introduction 
Despite growing popular support for political reform 
in Kenya, domestic opposition could not by itself 
secure regime change. Ultimately, it was international 
pressure that forced the government's domestic 
decision to legalize opposition.' 
Daniel Arap Moi never hid his dislike of mu/ti-party 
elections. The one held on December 29th (1992) was 
forced on him by foreign critics. 2 
The above two conclusions underline the key role of the external 
factor in Kenya's political change process whose turning point was the 
first multi-party elections in twenty-six years on December 29, 1992. The 
deep involvement of the international community in the process leading 
to legalization of opposition parties, release of political prisoners , and 
eventually the holding of the elections cannot be overemphasized . 
However, this assertion does not deny the equally important role played 
by domestic democratic forces. Like elsewhere in Africa , external events 
and factors tended to reinforce existing trends and the whole process of 
change was undeniably the result of an interrelation of domestic and 
international pressures. 3 External factors emboldened and catalyzed the 
national democracy movement which had been home-grown rather than 
foreign-imposed.◄ 
In Kenya, external pressure played a more decisive role because 
domestic democratic forces were internally weak and vulnerable to the 
state which had entrenched itself in a despotic manner . The domestic 
democratic movement lacked adequate resources of all kinds . Some of its 
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leaders had been detained, coopted into the system, or coerced into silence 
by the all-powerful state machinery. Some, especially the intellectual 
voices, had gone into exile abroad after being threatened with arrest and 
detention . In addition to the leadership deficit , the movement was denied 
any communication and information network. Social groups that usually 
act as networking mechanisms for democratic movements like student 
unions and grassroots associations were absent as the state had 
consistently suppressed any organization which threatened its hegemony . 
The state had used its extensive repressive legal machinery to thwart 
freedom of association . Most of all, the domestic forces lacked financial 
resources making it difficult to mobilize people . 
The weakness and helplessness of the democratic movement left 
external forces as the only match for the one-party regime. These forces 
included international financ ial institutions , especially the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other donor agencies on 
which Kenya had become increasingly dependent since independence, and 
other countries in the West (particularly the United States, Germany, 
Britain , and the Nordic countries) of which Kenya had become a political, 
military and economic client. The changing realities in the international 
system in the aftermath of the Cold War also opened many windows of 
opportunity for international action on the democratization of Kenya. 
This article examines the extent and manner in which external 
actors and factors influenced Kenya ' s domestic political change process . 
It covers primarily the period leading to and immediately after the 
December 29, 1992 elections although it concludes with a reflection on 
subsequent events, particularly the second multi-party elections held on 
December 29, 1997. 
The Political and Economic Crisis in Post-Colonial 
Kenya: The Basis for Change 
From independence in 1963 until recently, Kenya was regarded 
as a political and economic success story in a continent largely bedeviled 
by political instability and economic decline. Kenya ' s image as one of the 
few successful democracies in Africa was reinforced by the apparent 
political stability and the high economic growth rates in the 1960s and 
6 I The Journal of Political Science 
Kenya 
early 1970s .5 Compared to its neighbors - Somalia , Ethiopia, Uganda 
and Tanzani a - which were embroiled in political turmoil ( especially the 
first three) and economic stagnation, Kenya's record was indeed distinct. 
However, subsequent events reveal that this was largely a distinction 
without real difference. The problems which later created the clamor for 
political change in Kenya had their roots in its entire post-colonial history . 
Kenya began its independent life with a seemingly democratic 
structure: an elected bicameral legislature and prime minister and a multi-
party system with a strong opposition . From the beginning, there was a 
steady erosion and subversion of democratic institutions and norms by the 
regime. As early as 1964, Kenya had become a one-party state, albeit de 
facto, with a strong president. Multi-partyism resurged during the period 
1966-196 9 when the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) existed as an 
oppositio n party in parliament. But in 1969, Kenya became a de facto one-
party state again when KPU was banned. Attempts to form an opposition 
party in 1982 prompted the government to legalize the one-party system . 
Kenya's "se cond liberation" struggle then became a struggle against the 
de jure one- party system and for the restoration of the multi party system . 
By the time Jomo Kenyatta , the frrst president, died in 1978, the 
political landscape was anything but democratic . Executive power seemed 
uncheck ed. In addition , the legal system appeared to have been overtaken 
by an informal system based on favoritism and nepotism . 6 Parliament was 
muzzle d. Members with dissenting views were deprived of parliamentary 
immunity. Some, like Martin Shikuku and the late John Seroney, were 
detained for their utterances in parliament. Access to resources, both 
political and economic, depended on the acquiescence of the "Family", as 
the all-powerful clique around Kenyatta was called. The bureaucracy was 
tightly controlled and turned into a tool of social control. People were 
distanc ed from democratic control even further as local government lost 
its autonomy to central government. Any opposition was met with 
repressi on and opponents " ... were either integrated into the system or 
dispatc hed by economic intimidation, threats , denunciation or, 
occasionally, by detention. "7 The political system had become more 
hierar chical , operating as a patron-client system based on a combination 
of favoritism and repression . 
The presidency of Daniel Arap Moi, Kenyatta's successor, 
contin ued this pattern, initiating new measures that destroyed even the 
few democratic practices that had survived Kenyatta's rule. Arrests and 
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detentions increased, especially in the mid- l 980s. The growth of civil 
society was stymied as student unions, the Civil Servants' Union and the 
university Academic Staff Union were outlawed. Non-state groups that 
survived, like the Central Organization of Trade Unions and the Women's 
Organization , were coopted into the system, with the latter even adding 
KANU to its name. Few checks were left on executive authority, 
especially with the removal of tenure for the Attorney General, the 
Controller and Auditor-General, and judges between 1986 and 1988.8 
Freedom of press suffered severe setbacks as journalists were harassed 
and censorship strengthened. State-sanctioned tribalism was evident in job 
allocation. At the end of the 1980s almost all of the key positions in 
security and other government "gate-keeping" sectors, parastatals, civil 
service and the private sector were held by members of Moi' s minority 
group, the Kalenjin. 9 
On the economic front, Kenya's economic performance in the 
first two decades of independence was relatively impressive. From 1963 
to 1973, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average of6.5% 
annually and the inflation rate was less than 3%. Income per capita was 
relatively high and the balance of payments very favorable. Despite 
setbacks, especially the 1973-1974 and 1979 oil price shocks, the period 
up to 1980 can generally be regarded as having been economically good 
for Kenya. In fact, by the mid- l 970s even such scholars as Colin Leys, 
who had dismissed Kenya's economy as a mere "satellite" of the 
international capitalist economy and therefore not capable of standing on 
its own, revised his views and now talked of the emergence of a "home 
grown" bourgeoisie class with the entrepreneurial capability to steer the 
Kenyan economy on an independent course. 10 
However, the economy started to show overt signs oflong-term 
stress in the 1980s. The average annual GDP growth rate dropped from 
6.8% ( 1965-1980) to 4.2% (1980-1990} with corresponding declines in 
agriculture from 5.0% to 3.3%, industry from 9.7% to 3.9%, and 
manufacturing from 10.5%to4.9%overthesameperiod. 11 While in 1974 
Kenya was importing only 15,000 metric tons of cereals, in 1990 it was 
importing 188,000 metric tons. Food aid in cereals rose from 2,000 metric 
tons in 1974/1975 to 62,000 in 1989/1990.12 The balance of trade deficit 
grew even worse, leaping from Kenyan pounds 273.5 million in 1985 to 
1,139.9 million in 1990 with the overall balance of payment deficit 
standing at Kenya pounds 168.9 million in 1990. 13 The public external 
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debt had also more than doubled from Kenya pounds 2,723 .9 million in 
1985 to 73,330 .4 million in 1991. By 1992, Kenya was ranked the 24th 
poorest country in the world. 
Such was the political and economic situation in Kenya by the 
end of the 1980s when the struggle for change gained momentum, thanks 
to external factors. However , it needs to be emphasized that the political 
and economic crisis had been building up since independence in 1963. 
But the relatively favorable economic situation in the 1960s and a fair part 
of the 1970s and the careful political calculations by the regime even as 
it muzzled democratic practices kept agitation for change limited. The 
movement for democracy started gaining attention in the beginning of the 
1980s, especially with the unsuccessful attempt by two government 
critics, Mr . George Anyona and the late Oginga Odinga, to form an 
opposition party in 1982. After the government placed restrictions on the 
activities of Odinga and other few government critics, university students 
and a few radical faculty continued the democracy crusade through 
publication and dissemination of literature critical of the regime. In the 
mid• I 980s an underground movement, MW AKENY A, emerged . 
Although the movement was primarily associated with radical university 
lecturers and students, it succeeded in recruiting a few people mainly of 
peasant and working class origins. By 1987, however, the government had 
managed to crack down heavily on its suspected leadership and 
membership, some of whom were detained without trial or sentenced to 
lengthy prison terms by a judicial process unduly compromised by state 
patronage and control. 
Nevertheless, pressure ·for change continued to be exerted 
locally by the church and abroad by critics who had gone into exile, 
especially in the Nordic countries and the United States . By and large, 
however, the democracy movement was not strong enough to force 
change and the government always responded very harshly to any overt 
attempt to organize dissent. In 1989, with the developments in Eastern 
Europe where the one-party system was being successfully challenged and 
with the increasing association of African countries' poor economic 
performance with poor governance and lack of democracy, local critics 
stepped up their agitation for change, now demanding a multi-party 
system. The Moi regime attempted to reform the system while at the same 
time repressing dissent. For instance, in July, 1990, security forces 
descended on a large number of Nairobi residents who had turned up at 
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a rally called by multi-party proponents but which had been declared 
illegal by the government. In the same year , Odinga unsuccessfully 
attempted to register an opposition party . In 1991, in defiance of 
government, Odinga and other government critics formed a pressure 
group, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) , to organize 
the fight for change, and it was largely as the result of the activities of this 
group that the Moi regime succumbed and changed the constitution to 
allow for a multiparty system in December , 1991 and to arrange for the 
December 29 multi-party elections. Nevertheless , the success of the local 
democratic movement would not have been possible at that time without 
external pressure . Before examining the extent and nature of the influence 
of external forces, it is necessary to consider Kenya's place in the 
international system. 
Kenya in the International System 
After independence , Kenya occupied what could be termed a 
privileged position in East and Central Africa, if not in the whole of sub-
Saharan Africa. In the 1960s and 1970s, Western scholars boosted this 
position by portraying Kenya as one of the few successful stories in 
Africa economically and politically .14 To the West, Kenya's choice of 
capitalism made it a guardian of western values in the continent. is Few 
third world countries were so thoroughly incorporated into the 
international capitalist framework . 
As a result, Kenya attracted foreign (western) investors, 
organizations and international attention. Some 350 multinational 
companies in Africa are based in Nairobi, Kenya' s capital, which has also 
become an international conference center . Indeed, Kenya remains the 
only Third World country hosting the headquarters of a United Nations 
agency, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) . In addition, 
15 other UN bodies use Nairobi as their regional center. Multilateral 
donor agencies also use Nairobi as their base for regional operations . 
Kenya therefore was in the international spotlight. Indeed, the 
publicity political developments in Kenya received was in part a result of 
its special position in the region . Nairobi has been the operational base for 
international media . It was estimated that 154 international journalists 
were based in Nairobi at the onset of the current change process . 
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Kenya's special position was especially strengthened by the East-
West rivalry that characterized the Cold War world . Proximity to the horn 
of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean , all vital theaters of the 
Cold War, gave Kenya a high geostrategic value . Having adopted a pro-
Western stance, Kenya was a valuable ally to the West since it was a 
"possible launching site for a deployment force in the event of an 
incursion into the Persian Gulf by the Soviet Union or others." 16 Kenya's 
special relationship with the West was exemplified by a pact Kenya 
signed with the United States in 1981 making Kenya ' s air bases available 
for the refueling of U.S. military aircraft and its deep-water harbor at 
Mombasa available to the U.S. Navy's Indian Ocean fleet. 17 Moreover , 
the West also considered Kenya an ally in the fight against the spread of 
communism in East Africa. At one time or the other, Kenya ' s neighbors, 
especially Tanzania, Somalia and Ethiopia, were considered pro-Soviet 
and socialist in ideological orientation . In fact, because of the interest the 
West had in Kenya and Kenya's role as a bulwark against communism, 
Kenya was viewed by her neighbors as a "sub-imperial" state promoting 
the interests of imperialist powers .18 
The West was generous with economic and military aid. In fact, 
for a Jong time, Kenya was a favored African recipient of multilateral and 
bilateral assistance. 19 Because of the overriding importance of the Cold 
War as a detenninant of Western, especially American and British, 
relations with Kenya, this assistance was given with little or no concern 
as to whether it was being put to good use. Western donors also ignored 
"internal" issues such as repression and abuse of human rights, to some 
extent facilitated by western aid. So long as the country remained stable 
with no overt threat to its political system, the West was not concerned 
about the style of governance within Kenya. 
Kenya's foreign policy after independence was shaped by the 
country's relationship with the West and the dependent capitalist 
development approach. Hence, Kenya's most important external links and 
relationshi ps had been with the countries in the West, especially Great 
Britain and the United States.20 Expressed in Cold War tenns, Kenya's 
external behavior was pro-capitalist West and anti-communist East in 
virtually all aspects of international interaction. For instance, in the area 
of trade, in 1989, total exports to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) countries were valued at Kenya Pounds 44 7 .41 million compared 
to those to eastern Europe whose value was a paltry Kenya Pounds 25.57 
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million.21 Kenya's foreign aid and investment came mainly from western 
Europe and North America. Indeed, Britain, the U.S., West Germany, 
Japan, Italy, and France had the largest private capital in the country by 
the end of the 1980s. In total, 80% of Kenya's imports came from western 
sources. 
These economic, diplomatic and military relations with the West 
created a patron-client relationship with the foreign countries calling the 
shots. This, in part, explains why these countries, especially the U.S., 
Germany and Britain, found it easy to involve themselves in the clamor 
for political change in the country. Habits of reward for a pro-western 
stance during the Cold War became habits of punishment for failing to 
reform when the Cold War ended . Kenya became the first state in the 
region to face the wrath of the donor community when aid was suspended 
in November, 1991. 
The Global and Continental Contexts of Political 
Change in Kenya 
In addition to non-African sources of political change in African 
countries, important forces in the African continent played a key role as 
well . Demonstration effects in a particular country on its neighbors cannot 
be denied . The process of political liberalization has generally followed 
a standard course in most countries in Africa. 22 Cognizance should also 
be · taken of the fact that the timing of the process, particularly its 
beginning, appears to have been similar. The democratization process in 
Kenya coincided with what is now called Africa's "second wind of 
change." The first one was, of course, that which swept across the 
continent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, ushering in independence in 
former colonies . The second "wind" aimed at liberating Africans from 
dictatorial self-rule. Generally speaking, the movement for the second 
liberation in Africa had as its major objective the dismantling of the one-
party, military and other forms of dictatorship and misrule that 
characterized much of post-colonial Africa. 23 
The movement for the second liberation of Africa, like the first, 
was helped to its feet by dramatic global changes. In particular, the end of 
the Cold War and the demise of one-party communist regimes in Eastern 
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Europe influenced political developments in Africa in ways that favored 
the growth of democratic movements. First, the "people's revolutions" 
that swept eastern Europe in 1989 and thereafter, leading to the fall of 
one-party and communist regimes in many countries, including the Soviet 
Union, undermined the legitimacy of communist-leaning and one-party 
regimes in Africa . Countries like Angola, Benin, Mozambique and 
Ethiopia which were adherents of the Marxist-Leninist economic ideology 
had to re-examine themselves . Even those countries which were not 
communist but had adopted a state interventionist approach came under 
pressure to delink the state from major economic sectors . 
Second, most of the states in eastern Europe were one-party 
dictatorships like the majority of African states, Kenya included . The 
revolutions in eastern Europe had exposed the barrenness of the one-party 
system. In Africa, it became clear that tribalism, civil wars, corruption , 
mismanagement of economies and poverty were, to a large extent, results 
of one-party dictatorships. In particular, the tide against one-party regimes 
showed the single party propaganda as "a smoke screen under which the 
party and its leaders can enrich themselves, smuggle money overseas and 
buy foreign property, while pretending that their way is the only way 
forward." 24 Even Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's ex-President, one of the 
early ardent defenders and architects of the system, admitted that the 
"one-party state institutionalizes corruption. "2s Pluralism, defined in terms 
of multi-partyism, was considered a better system. The clamor for 
pluralism became a continental chorus and some states like Zimbabwe 
dropped advanced plans to introduce one-party rule while others put in 
motion processes towards multi-party elections. Indeed, the struggle in 
Kenya began with a direct challenge to section 2 (a) of the constitution, 
which had legalized the one-party system. 
Third, the events in eastern Europe had a demonstration effect 
on Africans to the extent that they demonstrated that popular dissent and 
uprising could bring down dictatorships, however strong they might be. 
By constantly drawing analogies between the situation on the continent 
and that in eastern Europe, Africa's opposition forces urged their 
followers to be prepared to sacrifice and to be courageous like their 
counterparts in places like Romania and the Soviet Union. 
The end of the Cold War also intensified the struggle for a 
second liberation in Africa. Africa's dictatorial regimes began tumbling 
down between 1989 and 1991, the same period that witnessed the final 
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stages of the Cold War . It meant an end to protection for client regimes 
by Cold War patrons . During the Cold War, the protagonists in the West 
and the East gave unconditional economic and military aid to regimes they 
considered valuable allies regardless of the character of the regime . As 
Haynes observes , " ... until the late 1980s the effects of the continuing Cold 
War meant that heads of a number of "conservative " states would be 
assured of a warm welcome in the West, virtually regardless of the 
inadequacies of their domestic policies , by interminably restating their 
antipathy to communism ."26 By the same token, leaders of the so-called 
"progressive " (Marxist-communist) states were welcomed in Moscow , 
East Berlin and Prague , their domestic policies notwithstanding . 
With the end of the Cold War, however , aid was increasingly tied 
to human rights and the democratic record of recipients. On the one hand, 
staunch communist-leaning regimes in places like Ethiopia , Mozambique , 
Angola and Benin lost their "protector " and were now exposed to the 
influence of the U.S. and the capitalist bloc. On the other hand, staunch 
pro-western regimes like Cote d' IVoire , Kenya and Zaire lost the Cold 
War card they played to secure aid and support from the West. The 
opportunity to play one superpower against the other and deflect attention 
from internal matters was now gone. 
Africa 's dictatorial regimes, whether previously pro-West or pro-
East, had now to seek support domestically. Given the ethos of pluralism 
of the remaining superpower , the U.S., this meant holding elections and 
recognizing multiple parties. This development emboldened national 
democratic forces which increasingly received support from the West. As 
Naomi Chazan observed , " ... in this changed environment , the United 
States and its European allies have been less prone to intervene on behalf 
of certain repressive or authoritarian regimes that they had supported in 
the past. "27 
Africa ' s second wind of change also contained currents 
generated from within the continent. African scholars , leaders and 
organizations had, in various continental and regional fora, recognized 
and emphasized the need for democratization . As early as 1985, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit had admitted that Africa's 
development crisis was partly the result of bad policy making. Then in 
1987, an international conference on Africa organized by African leaders 
in Abuja , Nigeria , produced the influential Abuja Document which 
emphasized the need for "decision making processes and leadership 
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structures that would widen the base for decision making and encourage 
popular debate over basic national development policies and their 
implementation." 28 It also stressed "new political perspectives that 
emphasize the democratization of the African society and increased 
accountability of those entrusted with responsibility." 29 The significance 
of the Abuja Statement lies in the fact that in an unprecedented move, 
African leaders were accepting that African societies needed to 
democratize, inter alia admitting that they had not been democratic. 
The Abuja Statement was followed closely by the Khartoum 
Declaration on the Human Dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery 
and Development, an outcome of a meeting of Africa's economic 
ministers in Khartoum in March, 1988. The declaration recognized that 
"lack of basic rights, individual freedom and democratic participation by 
the majority of the population was to blame for Africa's economic crisis 
and that "pervasive lack of democracy also makes mobilization and 
effective accountability difficult." 30 The resolutions of this meeting, like 
the Abuja Statement, exemplified official admission of past mistakes in 
governance and reflected the submission by African leaders to the wind 
of change(or clamor for democracy) sweeping across the continent. 
The impact of the second wind of change intensified in both the 
26th and 27th OAU summits in Addis Ababa (July, 1990) and Abuja 
(June, 1991) respectively . At both summits, the heads of state reiterated 
their admission that there was need for political change. 31 The former 
summit even adopted the "African Charter for Popular Participation in 
Development and Transformation" which was the result of an 
"International Conference on People's Participation" -sponsored by the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) of the United Nations . The 
conference, which had been attended by about 500 representatives of 
African grassroots organizations, governments, UN agencies and non-
governmental organizations, blamed Africa's economic crisis on the 
absence of full democratic rights" and called for the "opening up of 
political processes to accomodate freedom of opinion and tolerate 
differences. "32 
The Africa Leadership Forum, formed in 1990 by influential 
African leaders including Nigeria's ex-president Olesegun Obasanjo and 
the Executive Secretary of the ECA, Adebayo Adedeji, was yet another 
continental organization whose activities influenced the democratic 
movement in Africa. In particular, its "Conference on Security, Stability, 
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Development and Co-operation " held in Kampala , Uganda, in May, 1991, 
was a shot in the arm for democratic forces on the continent. The meeting, 
which brought together leaders from both the public and private sectors 
and was attended by leaders like Y oweri Museveni (Uganda's President) , 
Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia's ex-President) , Julius Nyerere (Tanzania's ex-
President ), Obasanjo and Adedeji, produced the "Kampala Document " 
urging African leaders to accept pluralism as a reality and to abandon one-
party and military dictatorships . 
Changes in South Africa , initiated by the de Klerk government ' s 
release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990, added some impetus for 
the democratic forces on the continent. The anti-apartheid struggle was 
seen as a catalyst for the contemporary democratic movement in Africa in 
the sense that it had been a struggle against oppression, violation of 
human rights and individual freedom, socio-economic inequalities and 
political dictatorship . As some African heads of state castigated the South 
African regime, their own moral bankruptcy was exposed and their 
positions became increasingly tenuous because they indulged in similar 
practices . Indeed , in Kenya , critics of the regime often likened political 
repression in the country to that in South Africa. When de Klerk began to 
remove repressive laws and set in motion processes that would lead to full 
democracy (apartheid was abolished in 1990 and South Africa held 
democratic elections in 1994), African opposition groups had even more 
convincing reasons to demand democratic reforms from their 
governments . 
The impact of the continental second wind of change on the 
democratization process in Kenya can neither be overemphasized, nor 
should it be exaggerated. As part of Africa, Kenya could not escape the 
effects of the powerful movement for pluralism and democracy that had 
engulfed the continent by the close of the 1980s. Developments within the 
continent affected Kenya both by way of catalyst and demonstration 
effect. As one-party dictatorships tumbled elsewhere, Kenya's opposition 
movement got the impetus to fight on. As opposition groups in other 
countries, notably Benin (multi-party elections replacing Karekou's 
dicatorship in 1989), Zambia (multi- party elections replacing Kaunda in 
1989), and Niger (the National Convention forcing a power-sharing 
system between parliament and the executive), scored gains against 
regimes, Kenyan opposition forces also crystallized and struggled in the 
belief that pluralism and multipartysm were inevitable. The formation of 
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the unregistered National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1990 by Odinga and 
the FORD pressure group was, in part, stimulated by events elsewhere in 
Africa. 
Against this background of world events and internal pressures , 
specific countries and international organizations played specific roles. 
Among the countries that played an active role was the U.S. Other 
western European countries also played a role but more as a concert group 
of donors. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
influenced political changes through their policies and withdrawal of aid. 
The culmination of these forces led to pressure on the Moi regime to 
accept and initiate political changes demanded by democratic forces. 
The U.S. and Political Change in Kenya 
The U.S. was one of the major external actors in the political 
change process. In applying pressure on the Moi regime, the U.S . acted 
both unilaterally and in concert with other members of the international 
community, especially its closest allies. The role of the U.S. took a 
particular character, in view of its hegemonic position as the only 
superpower in the post-Cold War environment. The manner and extent of 
its involvement was largely dictated by this global position. 
U.S. involvement in Kenya's democratization process was 
shaped by a shift in overall U.S. policy towards Africa beginning in 
1989/1990, a shift occasioned by a host of factors: the end of the Cold 
War leading to disengagement from Angola and Mozambique, the release 
of Nelson Mandela and the beginning of the end of apartheid in So,uth 
Africa, the realization by the U.S. that economic difficulties in sub-
Saharan Africa were attributable to issues related to governance, and the 
questioning by American tax payers of appropriating resources to aid 
corrupt African regimes . As a result , the Bush administration decided that 
America would no longer tolerate dictatorships or mismanagement of its 
funds abroad. 
The devaluation of Kenya's geostrategic importance was the 
most significant variable that dictated the manner, timing and extent of 
U.S. involvement in Kenya's domestic affairs. Indeed, the change in U.S. 
policy began to affect Kenya in earnest only after the U.S. was sure that 
the Cold War was completely dead and buried . As late as 1989, when the 
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Cold War had thawed, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 
Allison Rosenberg, was still testifying against congressional cuts in 
assistance to Kenya, Somalia and Zaire, warning that these were friendly 
governments useful as anti-communist allies. Yet barely two years later 
when the Soviet Union and the communist empire in eastern Europe had 
virtually collapsed, these same governments became casualties of a "new" 
policy tying aid to the "human rights" records of recipients. 
The United States Senate, in particular, exhibited hostility 
towards the Kenya government. It was seen as undemocratic but reluctant 
to join other African countries in initiating reforms. In 1990, senator 
Edward Kennedy successfully argued for a US$ 410 million cut in U.S. 
aid to Kenya citing human rights violations. 33 In November, 1991, when 
Kenya was due to meet the Paris (donors) Club to discuss disbursement 
of aid, Paul Simon, chairman of the Senate Africa sub-committee, 
emphasized: "we ought to cut off all aid (to Kenya)." 34 Expressing fear 
of an "onrush of political instability and economic decline," Senator 
Nancy Kassembaum teamed up with Simon to introduce legislation to 
abolish military aid and further cut development assistance. 35 The latter 
had, in any case, plummeted from US$ 55 million in 1989 to US$ 26 
million in 1991.36 The Senate, a very influential actor in the official 
relations between the U.S . and foreign governments, was thus 
underscoring the fact that it would no longer sanction official aid to 
Kenya unless the latter initiated the necessary democratic reforms. 37 In 
1991, some congressmen visited Kenya to impress upon President Moi the 
need to read the signs of the times. One such delegation, led by Senator 
Charles Robb, told Moi personally that human rights violations in Kenya 
were a matter of grave concern in the US.38 The senators thus influenced 
Kenya's democratization process by personally exerting pressure on 
President Moi, by influencing official US aid cuts, and by organizing 
delegations to Kenya. The campaign against the Moi regime in the United 
States may have influenced international opinion, especially among U.S. 
allies as well as the World Bank and IMF, who followed the U.S. lead in 
cutting aid to Kenya. 
If the legislature was quick to sound warnings to Moi by cutting 
aid, the executive initially dragged its feet. By 1989, it was clear that U.S. 
policy toward Africa was changing but it took some time before the new 
policy was translated into action. Despite the Bush administration's 
freezing US$4 l 3 million out of the total of US$446 million . in aid 
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authorized for 1990, the administration's plan in dealing with the Kenyan 
regime was still unclear . This is indicated by the zeal with which 
Rosenberg had testified against freeing aid to Kenya: "Should we be 
unable to sustain necessary assistance levels, we risk the collapse or delay 
of economic reforms, injury to friendly governments, and acrimonious 
charges of breach of faith. "39 
Initially, there also seemed to be a failure of communication 
between the U.S. embassy in Nairobi and Washington. Ambassador Smith 
Hempst one consistently and publicly sent out the message that the Moi 
regime was unworthy of US support unless it carried out substantive 
political and economic reforms. He publicly called for multi-party 
elections and expressed support for the growing opposition movement in 
the country. It was also Hempstone who, at a function at the Nairobi 
Rotary Club in May 1990, declared that from then on, the U.S. would 
provide aid only to countries that "nourish democractic institutions, 
defend human rights and practice multi-party politics.'"' 0 Later, to the 
chagrin of the Kenya government, he hosted several government critics at 
his reside nce on July 4, 1990 to commemorate U.S. independence day. 
As late as August 1990, Assistant Secretary of State Cohen had 
to fly to Nairobi "to calm the waters" after the Kenya government 
launched a rhetorical assault on the U.S. ambassador for publicly 
supporting the opposition. Indeed, Cohen declined to have audiences with 
human rights activists and relatives of political detainees and avoided 
negative comments on the Kenya government. Cohen's visit was evidence 
of the lack of the U.S. administration's resolve on Kenya. For the Kenyan 
domestic opposition, it was a retrogressive step. Africa Watch, a human 
rights monitor group, argued, "it (Cohen's visit) strengthened President 
Moi' s hand at a time of mounting pressure for Kenya to democratize and 
helped to facilitate the serious deterioration of respect for human rights 
that followed." 41 Cohen's visit, coming only a month after the Kenyan 
government had detained two prominent multi-party activists, Kenneth 
Matiba and Charles Rubia, and violently broken a pro-democracy rally in 
Nairobi leaving dozens of people dead, left a contradictory impression of 
U.S. policy. 
By 1991 when it became clear that the Cold War threat was 
ended, the U.S. administration came out strongly in support of pro-
democracy groups in Kenya and elsewhere, including Zaire. During the 
next two years, the administration exerted unprecedented pressure on Moi 
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aid by the Kenya government officials was quite influential in hardening 
Congress, the U.S. administration and other donor agencies against 
Kenya, eventually leading to the freeze in aid by the Paris Club in 
November 1991. 
As Hempstone was active on the diplomatic front, USAID, 
through its Democracy and Governance Assistance Program, was 
involved in practical policy implementation. lbrough its initiative, an 
infonnal "donor democracy" group was formed in Nairobi. This group 
met once a week and consisted of representatives from the embassies of 
the U.S ., Canada, Japan, Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Austria , Finland, 
Germany, Switzerland, and The Netherlands. The group, chaired by the 
Canadians, was influential by exerting pressure on their governments at 
home to enforce donor conditionalities . It thus played a significant role in 
influencing international donor opinion against Kenya. 
USAID also provided material assistance to the democratization 
process. For instance, it gave out a total of US$200,000 to the Kenya 
chapter of the International Commission of Jurists to support their 
democracy-related activities such as seminars. It also gave out financial 
assistance to local election monitoring groups and other non-governmental 
organizations involved in civic and voter education . 
Back in Washington, the administration maintained diplomatic 
pressure on the Kenyan government to insure that the elections scheduled 
for December 29, 1992 would be free and fair. Testifying before the 
House Africa sub-committee on June 23, 1992, Cohen cited several 
obstacles to free and fair elections: harassment of opposition party 
leaders, irregularities in voter registration, gagging of the press and ethnic 
violence in Western Kenya .46 "The U.S. policy toward Kenya," he added, 
"is to urge it to follow the path to a fully democratic and open society, the 
key to this is free and fair elections.'"'7 In a clear attempt to pressurize the 
Moi regime to remove the obstacles, Cohen stated categorically that 
progress toward political reform in Kenya was still "too modest and the 
setbacks too profound" to warrant releasing the US$ 28 million withheld 
by the U.S. following the Paris Club meeting the previous year. 
However, in the period immediately before the elections, the 
U.S. appeared to relax its pressure. This could be explained by U.S. 
involvement in the crisis in neighboring Somalia. The U.S. needed the 
Moi government's cooperation to airlift relief supplies to refugee centers 
both in northern Kenya and Somalia itself. Kenya's cooperation would 
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to accept multi-party elections, release political pns1oners, restore 
freedom of speech and press, and to liberalize the economy. Human rights 
and legal groups in Kenya received substantial assistance from the U.S., 
especially through USAID's Democracy and Governance Program based 
in Nairobi. Hempstone became even more vocal in his attacks against the 
government. In March 1991, he demanded the immediate release of all 
political prisoners and went so far as to ask the Attorney General to 
furnish him with the details about family visits to three detainees (Rubia, 
Matiba and Raila Odinga) after complaints that the three had been denied 
visits by relatives. 42 Although the Attorney General complied, government 
officials , including the foreign minister, called for Hempstone's recall. 
One member of parliament remarked," the moment we do that (comply 
with Hempstone's demands) we cease to be a sovereign state.'"'3 
Hempstone's highly publicized interest in the detainees' plight 
demonstrated his style of diplomacy which was in sharp contrast with that 
of some of his counterparts in Nairobi, especially that of the British High 
Commissioner. Adopting a plain speaking style and a pro-active public 
diplomacy, the ambassador launched such a concerted and spirited 
crusade against the Moi regime that the foreign minister, Mr. Ndolo Ayah, 
called him a racist, saying he had the attitude of a slave owner after 
Hempstone protested over the crackdown on a pro-multi-party rally in 
Nairobi on November 16, 1991. 44 In a show of support and to demonstrate 
that the ambassador was only passing the U.S. administration's message 
to Kenya, President Bush himself reiterated his full confidence in 
Hempstone and in his ability to carry out U.S . policy towards Kenya.45 
For the opposition, Hempstone was a providential gift whose 
spirited attacks on the regime had paid dividends, especially in the form 
of the release of political detainees. He had earlier demonstrated bis 
sympathies with the opposition when he gave refuge to Paul Muite and 
Kamau Kuria, opposition activists, while being pursued by government 
security personnel. The latter fled to the U.S. with the assistance of the 
embassy. 
Whether Hempstone was "undiplomatic" or not, his role in the 
process that led to the legalization of the multi-party system, the release 
of political prisoners and the general opening of Kenya's political space 
cannot be denied. He rallied foreign embassies to support the anti-
government crusade. In particular, his "get-rich-now" cable to his home 
government in which he detailed corrupt practices and misuse of donor 
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not be forthcoming in an atmosphere of acrimony . In gestures of goodwill 
and to demonstrate that the U.S. was not against Kenya as such, the Bush 
administration committed some US$ 700,000 in "Disaster Assistance 
Funds" to move food by air and road to drought stricken areas of nothern 
Kenya, in addition to the 6,000 metric ton of food worth over US$ 3.4 
million donated in mid-1992. 
US pressure on the Moi regime also relaxed considerably after 
the elections which saw Moi returned to power. To opposition charges 
that Moi had rigged himself back to to power, Hempstone responded that 
the elections had been largely free and fair, reminding the opposition 
leaders that if anything, disunity in the opposition had given Moi room for 
manouvering back to power. The U.S. government also agreed to release 
some US$ 3 million in military aid. However, the U.S. continued to apply 
pressure on the government to undertake economic reforms within the 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) framework and played a key role 
in persuading Kenya to resume SAP implementation when it suspended 
them in March 1993. 
The Role of Britain 
If the role of the U.S. was important in Kenya's change process 
because of its sole superpower status, that of Britain was special and 
significant because of colonial legacy. British interests in Kenya were 
more entrenched and larger. Britain remained Kenya's largest trading 
partner, major long-term source of foreign aid and the main supplier of 
military arms . 48 For instance, in military aid, cumulative arms delivery to 
Kenya in the period 1985-1989 were valued at US$ 120 million from 
Britain compared to US$ 30million from the US.49 Britain also has 
maintained the largest private capital investment from a foreign country 
in Kenya . 
However, Britain's role in the events and processes that led to 
the multi-party elections in Kenya and the opening of Kenya's political 
space contrasted sharply with that of the U.S. and other western countries. 
The British role can best be described as ambivalent and ambiguous . It 
has been argued, for instance, that despite official proclamations in 
support of political and economic reform , Britain lacked a firm 
22 / The Journal of Political Science 
Kenya 
commitment to the restoration of democracy in Kenya.50 Such critics 
suggest British collaboration with the Moi regime, ignoring the domestic 
clamor for democracy. 
Critics of the British point out that when the U.S. embassy was 
sending home cables critical of the Moi regime and calling for pressure 
on the government to allow multi-partyism, the British High Commisssion 
was sending different cables to White Hall. In early 1992, the High 
commission sent a cable to the foreign office in London narrating the 
" importance and significance" of Kenya to Britain, citing the fact that 
British investment in Kenya was one billion British Pounds (about US$2 
billion), and that Kenya provided the British with military training and 
oversight facilities and concluded that the Moi government had served 
British interests well.51 
While Hempstone and ambassadors from European countries 
like Denmark and Norway publicly called for the release of political 
prisoners, the British High Commission remained mum or made 
statements suggesting that it had no business making such requests. In 
1990, the then British High Commissioner, Sir Roger Tomkyns, told a 
Kenyan government minister that it was not his duty to question reasons 
for political detentions but to "promote friendship between Kenya and 
Britain." 52 Even when the High Commission broke tradition to issue a 
public protest after the government crackdown on the November 16, 1991 
opposition rally, it could only "express concern" whereas the embassies 
of Germany, Denmark and the U.S. sent stronger protest notes, even 
threatening aid termination. 53 
Whitehall in turn was also sending mixed signals, failing to come 
out with a clear position on the political situation in Kenya. In 1991, the 
British minister for overseas development, Lynda Chalker, after 
reiterating that "British development assistance would now be linked to 
good government," later qualified her statement by denying that this 
implied an aid cut to Kenya. 54 Indeed, throughout the period leading to the 
multi-party elections, the British government kept a low profile relative 
to other western governments. Chalker spent most of her time dismissing 
radical approaches espoused by the British opposition and even some 
members of the ruling Conservative Party. 
The ambiguity of the British response to the clamor for change 
in Kenya influenced Kenya's democratization process in important ways. 
It led to intransigence on the part of the Moi government. Moi was 
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assured ofBritish support. It denied crucial support to the opposition from 
a country with the largest economic leverage over the Moi regime, and an 
ex-colonizing power at that. One journalist has summarized British 
behavior in the period leading to the elections as one of"a sad misuse of 
influence . "55 
Britain, of course, did play a role in pressuring the Moi regime 
to carry out political reforms . Britain was Kenya's most important 
bilateral donor and provided crucial assistance in military, technical and 
economic fields. The fact that it joined other donors in cutting off quick 
disbursement aid during the Paris Club meeting in November 1992 was 
definitely a blow to the Kenya government. Earlier in the same year it 
refused to provide Kenya with a US$ 7 million grant to subsidize rising 
consumer fuel costs at the height of the Gulf crisis because of fears that 
the grant "would be siphoned off by the interests of Mr. Biwott (then a 
member ofMoi's cabinet)." 56 These two actions by the British must have 
surely worried the Kenya government and may have convinced Moi of the 
inevitability of political reform. 
Besides supporting joint external donor pressure, Britain also 
played other important roles in the democratization pi'ocess. It was an 
active member of the informal donor group referred to earlier . It also 
contributed ballot boxes for polling on election day. However, the fact 
that the British government only came in to supply the boxes after the Moi 
government had refused a similar offer by the European Commission 
confirmed the notion that the Moi regime trusted Britain more than other 
external actors. 
The British also helped train Electoral Commission personnel in 
addition to supplying office machinery and equipment to facilitate the 
work of the Commission. Some non-governmental organizations involved 
in voter education and creation of public awareness aimed at increased 
political participation also benefitted from financial aid from the British 
High Commission . 
Whatever the British contribution to the change process that 
culminated in the December 29 elections, their actions and role, like that 
of the U.S., were determined largely by what were perceived to be their 
national interests in Kenya at that particular time. One senior diplomat of 
the High Commission in Nairobi, for instance, emphasized that British 
interests in Kenya were so crucial that Britain would be the last country 
to encourage a regime that would perpetrate chaos and instability. 57 The 
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British have since Kenya's independence been pre-occupied with the 
maintenance of a stable regime sympathetic to British interests . It could 
thus be argued that the British decided not to push too far for Moi ' s exit 
because the mainstream opposition party, FORD, was dominated by 
radical young intellectuals with known anti-capitalist credentials who 
would most likely not be sympathetic to foreign, especially British, 
economic interests in Kenya. It is likely that Britain would be happy with 
a conservative, largely propertied leadership whose ideology coincided 
with that of British capital. 
Other Western Countries 
Apart from Britain, other European countries played a role in 
exerting pressure on the Moi regime. The most resolute in their influence 
were the Scandinavian countries, Germany and The Netherlands. Some 
of these were more emphatic and resolute in exerting pressure than 
Britain. 58 However, unlike the U.S. and Britain, they played their role 
using only the leverage of economic aid. 
The Scandinavians started associating with the opposition to the 
Moi government as early as the mid- l 980s when many political 
"dissidents" from Kenya were granted refuge there, especially in Norway 
and Sweden . In fact, in September 1990, Kenya severed diplomatic 
relations with Norway, expelling Mr. Neils Dahl, the Norwegian 
ambassador. In protest, Norway withdrew its participation in several 
projects funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD). 
In 1991, Denmark ended its 17-year support for rural 
development through the Rural Development Fund (RDF) after an audit 
report revealed that some US$ 40 million had disappeared, allegedly 
through corruption . 59 The Danes also demanded the prosecution of 
government officials implicated in the mismanagement of the Fund. The 
action by the Danish government greatly marred Kenya's image among 
donors abroad. The revelations of corruption and misuse of donor funds 
by senior government officials made other donors reappraise their 
positions. Increasingly, donors now demanded transparency and 
accountability which, they claimed, could only be assured in a democratic 
system of governance. The Kenyan government appeared to be aware of 
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the damage caused by the Danish action and two District Commissioners 
were arraigned in court in connection with misuse of RDF funds. 
However, the cases against these officers were dropped after the pressure 
had waned. 
Another country which contributed significantly to external 
pressure on Kenya was Germany. The German ambassador was second 
only to Hempstone in his public attacks on corruption and violation of 
human rights. For instance, in the wake of the arrests of leading 
opposition figures on the eve of the pro-multi-party rally scheduled for 
November 16, 1991, the German ambassador sent a protest note to 
Kenyan government officials declaring his government's "concern at the 
human rights abuse in Kenya" and warned that no such violation would 
be tolerated by the German people. 60 Germany threatened to freeze all aid 
to Kenya. 
These other countries lacked the power of Britain (as a former 
co Ionia! power) and of the U.S. ( as a world superpower). But their actions 
and pressure had a telling impact on the change process in Kenya , directly 
by denying aid and indirectly by publicizing corruption and the dictatorial 
tendencies of Moi regime. Thus they applied both bilateral and 
multilateral (as members of the Paris Club) pressure on the Kenya 
government. Such pressure played an important role in influencing the 
government's decision to legalize the multi-party system in December, 
1991 and to release political prisoners. 
The World Bank, The IMF, Structural Adjustments 
and Donor Conditionality 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are 
among the most influential international actors in the democratization 
processes in Africa through the SAPs developed in the early 1980s. The 
watershed was the Bank's linking of economic rehabilitation to political 
liberalization, paving way for political conditionalities on economic aid.6 1 
In its 1989 publication entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth, the Bank emphatically averred that the success of the 
economic reform measures in Africa squarely depended on the creation 
of an enabling environment of good governance. This view received 
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immediate, almost unqualified, support among bilatral and multilateral 
donors. For African countries, the Bank's influence was enormous given 
that it controlled over US$ 12 billion of the US$ 15 billion annual 
international aid to Africa. Thus the fact that the Bank was introducing 
political variables into economic aid issues had to be taken seriously. 
According to the Bank, the authoritarian and corrupt political 
systems found inAfrica could not be relied upon to implement the SAPs 
successfully. The transparency, accountability, and popular participation 
in decision making and implementation of policies required for sustained 
economic recovery could only be guaranteed by pluralistic, open and 
generally democratic political systems. The Bank, IMF, and other donors 
began tying aid to political reforms, the major component of which was 
the replacement of the military and one-party regimes with multi-party 
ones. Issues like human rights, freedoms of speech, the press , movement 
and assembly, together with tolerance towards government critics were 
part of the political package. 
The relationship between SAPs and democratization, especially 
the claim that SAPs can lead to political liberalization and democracy in 
Africa, was and remains controversial. What is obvious, however, and the 
point emphasized here, is that the SAPs played a major role in forcing 
otherwise recalcitrant one-party and military regimes in Africa to open up 
their countries to multi-party politics and to carry out political reforms, 
however minimal these reforms may have been. In recognition of this fact, 
Africa Confidential, an influential commentary on contemporary African 
affairs observed , 
It is now clear that the main cause of the wave 
of political change sweeping Africa is not the 
aspiration of African intellectuals, much as they long 
for liberty; nor is it the union of political opposition 
and the masses . No . The principal cause of Africa's 
wind of change is the World Bank and the donor 
community.62 
It was ironic that Kenya became the first country in its region to 
face the wrath of the donor community led by the Bank for not having 
sufficiently implemented the SAPs. It was equally interesting that Kenya, 
early in 1993 suspended, though temporarily, implementation of the 
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programs citing erosion of sovereignty and hardships engendered by the 
programs. It was ironic because Kenya was also the first country in Africa 
to start a SAP with the Banlc in 1980. In that year, pushed by financial 
desperation arising from mounting external debt, spiralling inflation , 
falling GDP and GNP levels, the decline in agricultural and industrial 
output, a huge budget deficit and a worsening balance of payments, Kenya 
approached the Banlc and the IMF for external financing . In March, 1980, 
the Banlc released to Kenya a US$ 55 million loan. In 1982, an IMF 
standby of SDR 151 million and a further Banlc loan US$ 60.9 million 
and an SDR credit of US$ 62.9 million were again extended to Kenya .63 
All these loans were extended within the framework ofSAPs and 
on the basis of Kenya's acceptance of the conditions which were initially 
largely economic rather than political. These conditions included refonns 
in the areas of pricing and marketing of agricultural products and also 
public expenditure refonns. The reforms specifically involved currency 
devaluations, cuts in government spending, deregulation of prices of 
goods and services, privatization of public sector enterprises, and export 
promotion, among others. 
Towards the late 1980s the Banlc and the donor community were 
not happy with the slow pace at which Kenya was implementing the 
SAPs. More conditions were attached to aid. With time, these conditions 
assumed a political character. The Paris Club meeting between Kenya and 
its donors under the chairmanship of the Banlc on November 25, 1991 
ended on a sour note . The Banlc and other major donors, including 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Gennany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Britain, the US, the African Development Bank, 
and the European Economic Community, among others, withheld quick-
disbursement aid and gave Kenya a list of refonns they wanted initiated 
before discussions on aid resumption could resume. These conditions 
included transparency and accountability in decision making, reduction 
of the wage bill, the upholding of the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, finn action to deal with official corruption, retrenchment of civil 
service and privatization of public enterprises. The Moi regime, realizing 
that further resistance might spell doom, moved quickly to release 
political prisoners, and called a special Party meeting in early December 
which hurriedly repealed section ·2(a) of the constitution, thus making 
Kenya a multi-party state again. Elections were arranged and finally held 
in December, 1992. 
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Conclusion 
External actors and factors played a key role in Kenya's transition 
to multiparty democracy . The resilience of external pressure expressed 
itself particularly in the sense that it was foreign critics who finally made 
the Moi regime legalize the opposition. The regime's intransigence, 
particularly on the issues of the release of political prisoners, free and fair 
voter registration , creation of a free atmosphere of political campaign for 
opposition parties , allowing foreign election observers and monitors, and 
the composition and independence of the Electoral Commission showed 
that the regime was out to frustrate the democratization process to ensure 
its survival. Indeed, Moi himself did not hesitate to state publicly several 
times, even at the height of the election campaign, his dislike for 
multiparty politics . He made it known that the process was imposed on 
him. 
Without foreign pressure, particularly from donors, domestic 
forces on their own would not have achieved a multiparty system, 
relative ly free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections , a freer 
press, and an improved atmosphere of free speech. In any case, the 
polariza tion of the domestic opposition movement along ethnic and 
personal ity lines before and after the 1992 elections only strengthened 
Mo i's hold on the political system and rendered domestic pressure largely 
ineffective in the face of an institutionalized and experienced regime. 
Even in the countdown to elections, the opposition was so divided that 
many observers , domestic and foreign, had foretold Moi's victory well 
before the ballot day. 
What about the future? Considering the continued weakness of 
a domestic opposition which Moi has succeeded in dividing and 
manipulating , it would not be an exaggeration to claim that the future of 
Kenya's democratization process still depends heavily on the nature and 
extent of the involvement by foreign actors , especially the donors . 
However , foreign actors are limited by their specific interests which may 
not necessarily coincide with those of Kenyans who in the long run will 
determine the outcome. The sustenance and continuation of the process 
depends heavily on domestic forces . In fact, Western donors, who played 
the dominant role in forcing the multiparty elections on Moi, resumed aid 
to Kenya afterwards. Despite the fact that the post-1992 election Moi 
regime remained stubborn and even reneged on major issues of political 
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refonn, most of the donors showed little enthusiasm in the political 
situation in the country as Moi prepared to rig the next elections in 
December 1997. The political terrain was still tilted in favor of Moi's 
party , KANU, because Moi refused to institute meaningful electoral 
refonns . Opposition leaders were still denied licences to hold political 
rallies while provincial administrations were successfully used to muzzle 
local government. For the moment, donors appeared to be more interested 
in economic refonns which Moi has shown more enthusiasm in 
implementing than the political ones. So long as Moi continues to 
implement economic refonns and aid continues to come, he can bracket 
political refonns for the time being. He will, as he has done in the past 
five years, divide the opposition while carrying out piecemeal reforms 
sufficient to placate the international community. 
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